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Secrecy and National Commercial 
Information Policy 
HAROLD C. RELYEA 
THEOBJECT OF BUSINESS is sales and profits. And businesses go to great 
lengths to make known or advertise what they have to sell. But they also 
seek control over information concerning their sales and the production 
of what they are selling-goods and services. Secrecy, it has been said, is 
the soul of business. And the penchant for secrecy may be explained in a 
variety of ways: market advantage, investment protection, quality con- 
trol, or production security, to name but a few considerations. Such 
reasons are obvious, unsurprising, and, in many regards, 
understandable. 
However, in modern industrialized democracies-such as the Uni- 
ted States-businesses have not been able to make absolute assertions of 
secrecy. Generally speaking, for the privilege of operating in the mar- 
ketplace, businesses provide certain information to government as the 
regulator of social and economic intercourse. Justice Brandeis made this 
same point over fifty years ago in the following memorable words: 
Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always 
a matter of state policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to 
achieve an end which the State deems desirable.' 
From this situation there arises a condition of continuous tension 
as to the kinds and quantities of business information that are provided 
to government as well as the arrangements under which it  is obtained, 
maintained, and utilized by agencies of the state. 
Harold C. Relyea is a specialist in American National Government, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
SUMMER 1986 43 
HAROLD RELYEA 
Furthermore, government may make general rules for society 
regarding the privileged status of different kinds of business informa- 
tion. The unauthorized disclosure of proprietary knowledge or “trade 
secrets,” for example, might be made punishable through the judicial 
process. Conversely, temporary exclusive use of information about a 
device or machine might be granted to an inventor provided it is 
available for public use after a particular period of time. 
Businesses in the United States devote considerable resources to 
secrecy matters. Billions of dollars are spent each year on “industrial 
security” arrangements to safeguard information. But probably as 
much, if not more, is allocated annually to intelligence endeavors for 
gathering information about competitors. And armies of attorneys, 
lobbyists, and publicists are regularly retained to plead the cause of 
business control of business information, to check potential public- 
policy changes threatening business information protection, and to 
monitor and, if necessary, challenge government institutions attempt- 
ing to disclose business information. 
What is explored here are the contexts in which secrecy is applied to 
business information as a matter of public policy. However, some 
theoretical and conceptual caveats are in order. The overview is, as the 
title suggests, confined to policies and practices of the U.S. federal 
government. Further, lest the title be misunderstood, there is no single, 
unified national commercial information policy. This is a generic 
reference. There are, of course, a variety of federal commercial informa- 
tion policies that are sometimes related. 
Next, a few words about the concept of secrecy. The defining trait or 
characteristic of secrecy, as Sissela Bok notes, is concealment or hiding.2 
An important consideration in this discussion is the extent to which 
concealment can be realized by businesses. Bok also points out that this 
understanding of the term is a neutral one which does not assume “that 
secrets are guilty or threatening, or on the contrary, awesome and 
worthy of re~pect .”~ This perspective has guided the analysis offered 
here, but does not necessarily underlie the policies under examination. 
When Edward Shils defines secrecy as “the compulsory withholding of 
knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure, ’ j4  we 
are reminded that policymakers, indeed, have made judgments that 
certain applications of secrecy to information must be respected or 
punishments shall ensue. 
Then, we come to the object of secrecy-business information. It 
was said at the outset that businesses in the United States seek control 
over information concerning their sales and the production of what they 
are selling. The reference to sales and production information is broadly 
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interpreted here. And the seeking of control over information is des- 
cribed, as a matter of emphasis, as “a condition of continuous tension.” 
Thus, businesses are continuously attempting to make or keep secret 
that information which they determine to merit protection. In law or 
public policy affording some type of secrecy, definitions or characteriza- 
tions of this information may be subject to administrative interpreta- 
tion or susceptible to modification through litigation. Recognizing 
these somewhat unsettled conditions, it has been said that what is 
explored here are the contexts in which secrecy is applied to business 
information as a matter of public policy. In brief, there are, as will be 
seen, various and changing understandings of “business information” 
in federal law and policy. 
Finally, our subject matter certainly lends itself to more analysis 
and exploration than is offered here.5 To reiterate, this discussion is a 
general overview and, as such, it does not purport to be definitive or 
exhaustive. Space considerations alone posed a practical limitation. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that a useful treatment has resulted. 
The Privacy Threshold 
There can be little doubt that privacy-the autonomous determina- 
tion of when, how, and to what extent information about oneself is 
communicated to others-has become an increasingly important and 
cherished value in American society. And, from time to time, assertions 
are heard that businesses-particularly corporations as personae 
fictae-are entitled to privacy protections equal to those afforded by the 
law as personal privacy rights. However, without detailing theseanalo- 
gous protections, it is sufficient to say that this contention has not 
gained acceptance. As one witty jurist once stated the prevailing view, 
“if you don’t have any privates, you’re not entitled to any privacy.” 
A century ago, the Supreme Court recognized corporations as being 
“persons,” but has not vested them with the privacy rights reserved for 
individuah6 Edward Shils described privacy some years ago as “the 
voluntary withholding of information reinforced by a willing indiffer- 
ence.”’ In this context, perhaps businesses or corporations may lay a 
claim to a privacy interest. However, during the past few decades, the 
voluntary withholding of information has broken down in the face of 
increased regulatory and verification demands, more rigorous surrepti- 
tious collection efforts, and the skillful application of new technology 
in these matters. As a result, both individuals and organizations have 
sought protection in the law. “The lack of privacy for certain core 
secrets,” Alan F. Westin has observed, “can threaten the independence 
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or autonomous life of an organization much as it does that of an 
individual.”* 
Whether privacy is effectively enjoyed by both individuals and 
businesses in the United States may be, to some extent, a matter of 
definition. However, they do not enjoy equal privacy rights. Generally, 
when legal protection has been accorded to the information of busi-
nesses, it has been done for economic reasons and without explanation 
in terms of privacy rights. By contrast, the protection of individuals’ 
personal privacy has been based upon human values and traits with 
specific identification of several privacy rights rooted in the Constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~In sum, there are more appropriate and perhaps more important 
concepts than privacy to be considered when assessing the contexts in 
which secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of public 
policy. 
Trade Secrets 
If there is a jewel in the crown of business information protection it 
is the law of trade secrets. The concept of a trade secret is not well defined 
or, perhaps better stated, its definition is not a commonly agreed upon 
understanding. Flexibility in interpretation is desirable so that new 
technologies and intellectual endeavors may be accommodated by the 
term and its underlying protective status. Probably the most widely 
accepted statement of what constitutes a trade secret is found in the 
Restatement of Torts which, in part, says: “A trade secret may consist of 
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity toobtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”” 
Given the somewhat loose nature of the trade secret concept, it 
should not be surprising that the law of trade secrets is rather pliable. It 
is largely judge-made, although there are some state and federal statutes 
providing remedies against the disclosure of trade secrets. And it is in the 
common-law tradition, arising from usages and customs of immemori-
al antiquity and from the judgments and decisions of the courts recog- 
nizing, affirming, updating, and enforcing such past practices. 
Historically, the law of trade secrets arose from a concern about 
commercial ethics. In brief, its purpose is largely to enforce standards of 
fair play in business conduct. There are, therefore, certain expectations 
that must be met in order that judicial protection or a statutory remedy 
may apply. First, it must be demonstrated that the information in 
question constitutes a trade secret-that i t  is used in one’s business, 
provides a competitive advantage, and is exclusively held. Second, it 
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must be shown that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the 
information from becoming known by “proper” means. Third, the 
secrecy breach must be established: the information was obtained by 
“improper” means or in violation of a contractual or fiduciary 
obligation. 
There are several secrecy considerations worth mentioning at this 
juncture. First, depending upon the circumstances, a business may not 
seek recovery for the loss of a trade secret for fear that, in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, more details about the trade secret at issue might 
have to be disclosed or other confidential commercial information 
might have to be revealed. Protective orders, of course, may be a mitiga- 
ting factor. Nevertheless, the situation serves to explain why trade se- 
crets may be closely held by a selective few within a business and also 
why litigation directly addressing loss of trade secrets is not always 
pursued, particularly when some other prosecutorial strategy of less 
commercial risk might be available. 
This brings us to the second and third pertinent secrecy considera- 
tions. Although the law of evidence affords trade secrets a privilege from 
routine disclosure in litigation, i t  is not an absolute protection. In order 
to have a fair trial, judges have ordered the production of documents and 
testimony involving trade secret information. The privilege is, there- 
fore, a qualified one. 
Third, businesses have found contracts and agreements to be a 
useful and effective way to protect trade secrets. Certainly for practical 
reasons, physical safeguards, compartmentalization of knowledge, and 
the close holding of information by a selective few are not always 
sufficient or adequate. A nondisclosure contract not only provides an 
element of flexibility in security arrangements, but also offers an alter- 
native, and perhaps less risky, prosecutorial strategy for punishing trade 
secret losses. In brief, a business may find it  more desirable to pursue a 
breach of contract lawsuit than to litigate directly on expropriation of a 
trade secret. 
Finally, i t  should be apparent from the foregoing paragraphs that 
trade secrets are a peculiar kind of secret. In fact, the term is something of 
a misnomer. Trade secrets are often widely known. As a consequence of 
nondisclosure contracts, a great many employees in a particular busi- 
ness may be exposed to its trade secrets. Through licensing arrange- 
ments, a corporation may reveal trade secrets to another firm. And 
certainly more than one business has become aware that a competitor, 
through independent initiative, possesses and uses a trade secret which 
is not its exclusive knowledge. 
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It isdifficult tosay, withanydegreeofcertainty, what theattractive- 
ness of the trade secrets system is vis-a-vis, for example, the patent 
arrangement. One attribute would appear to be the general flexibility of 
trade secrets law. But, while this consideration attests to the need to 
accommodate new production processes and technology, another 
attraction of trade secrets safeguards may be their propensity for preserv- 
ing the status quo. This occurs partly because trade secrets arise from a 
common-law tradition and partly because of an acceptance of the 
secrecy myth attending this particular type of knowledge. Trade secrets 
are protected as a consequence of custom and past practice, and also 
because they stand sui generis as business information actually used in 
production and providing a competitive advantage. A great deal of the 
character of trade secrets rests with their status of being a veiled secret. 
Patent Protection 
By contrast, information protected under federal patent law has the 
status of being an open secret. The situation is nicely described by a line 
from the third act of M a n  and Superman when Shaw has one of his 
characters say: “We shall never be able to keep the secret unless every- 
body knows what i t  is.” 
A patent is a seventeen-year right of exclusive use given to an 
inventor in exchange for the disclosure of the invention so that it will be 
available for free public use when the patent period expires.”Like trade 
secrets law, patenting grew out of concern for commercial ethics and 
seeks, as well, to provide incentives for innovation. The Republic of 
Venice is credited with enacting the first patent law in 1474. Such a 
statute initially appeared in the United States in 1641 as a consequence 
of legislative action taken in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.” When the 
federal Constitution was ratified in 1788, it specifically empowered 
Congress, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, “Topromote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Disc~ver ies .”~~The first federal patent law was subsequently enacted in 
1790.14 
As might be anticipated, inventors, lawyers, and judges have found 
interpretation of the patent statute and resolution of patent lawsuits 
inordinately difficult. A few years ago, Justice Byron Whitecommented 
in an opinion “that patent litigation can present issues socomplex that 
legal minds, without appropriate grounding in science and technology, 
may have difficulty in reaching de~is ion .” ’~  
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Under current patent arrangements, all the information in a patent 
application is held in confidence by the Patent andTrademark Office of 
the Department of Commerce until the patent actually issues. Approved 
patent applications may be inspected, but the information may not be 
utilized during the patent period except through licensing with the 
holder. Patent infringement or piracy may be pursued in court. How- 
ever, this kind of litigation, as noted earlier, is highly complex, often 
prolonged, and usually expensive. For several reasons, patenting is less 
desirable than trade secrets protection. Nevertheless, there are certain 
types of inventors who find these arrangements quite suitable for their 
purposes. Universities and small businesses, for example, may not be 
prepared to maintain a trade secret or otherwise may regard patentinga 
better way to realize profit through the licensing or sale of the patented 
information. Also, in an area of rapid development, an inventor may 
consider seventeen-year exclusive use adequate, knowing that by the 
time the protection period lapses, innovation will provide patentable 
enhancements on the original invention or some other improvement 
making it obsolete. 
Regarding the shift away from patenting, Russell Stevenson 
recently wrote that, “while the empirical evidence is scanty, it appears 
that reliance on trade-secret protection is increasing, and in many cases 
even where inventions meet the standards of patentability.”16 Heoffers a 
number of reasons for this phenomenon. First, it is more expensive to 
acquire and defend a patent than to keep a new technological develop- 
ment protected by trade secrets arrangements. Second, in addition to 
cost considerations, the law of trade secrets is thought to be more 
successful in safeguarding proprietary information. Third, because 
approved patent applications are subject to public scrutiny, there is a 
preference for the security afforded by trade secrecy. Finally, there are 
innovations that simply are not patentable. 17 
There is one other aspect of the patent system that some might find 
repugnant and perhaps threatening. This is the possibility that the 
government might seize a patent application, divert it from being the 
basis for an open secret, and impose in its stead an order for absolute 
secrecy. How does this happen? 
Shortly after the United States entered World War I, Congress 
provided authority for the Commissioner of Patents” or the pre~ident’~ 
to withhold certain patents the publication of which might “be detri- 
mental to the public safety or defense, or may assist the enemy or 
endanger the successful prosecution of the war,” in order to keep the 
invention in question secret. Congress broadened the Patent Commis- 
sioner’s powers in this area in 1940 by deleting the requirement that the 
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United States be at war and by allowing the commissioner to so with-
hold the grant of a patent “for such period or periods as in his opinion 
the national interest requires.”20 This general authority lasted until the 
end of World War II.21 However, a permanent statute on this matter was 
subsequently enacted in 1952.22 
The Invention Secrecy Act currently provides that “whenever the 
publication or disclosure of an invention by the granting of a patent, in 
which the Government does not have a property interest, might, in the 
opinion of the [Patent] Commissioner, be detrimental to the national 
security,” he shall make the application available to certain specified 
defense agencies for review. In the event that one of these defense 
agencies determines that “the publication or disclosure of the invention 
by the granting of a patent therefor would be detrimental to the national 
security,...the Commissioner shall order that the invention be kept 
secret and shall withhold the grant of a patent” for not more than one 
year, subject to a possible renewal. 23 These secrecy restrictions may be 
appealed to the Secretary of Commerce24 and a claim for compensation 
for the damage caused by such a secrecy order may be made through the 
proper federal court.25 
Although patent secrecy orders are not applied to a large quantity 
of independently developed innovations, their effect is decisive. An 
inventor subject to such an  order who willfully publishes or discloses 
the information i t  covers not only forfeits his patent right but also can be 
fined $10,000 or imprisoned for two years, or both.26 The affected 
proprietary information is not usable. Compensation is difficult to 
obtain and usually no details are provided regardin the national secur- 
ity detriment prompting the government’s action. f7 
Statutory Protection 
The law of trade secrets and patenting arrangements are two major 
ways in  which secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of 
public policy. As the discussion indicates, neither system affords abso- 
lute protection. They are designed to facilitate fair commercial practice 
in the marketplace. Because i t  is a marketplace subject to government 
scrutiny and regulation, there is a necessity for the government toobtain 
various kinds of business information. In this regard, there arise addi- 
tional contexts in which secrecy is applied to business information as a 
matter of public policy. 
Both Congress and the federal courts have discretionary authority 
for protecting business information. Congressional committees may 
invoke their rules for an executive session and receive business informa- 
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tion in a closed proceeding or as if they were conducting a secret 
meeting. Similarly, a federal judge, as mentioned earlier, may issue a 
protective order limiting the availability of business information intro- 
duced in conjunction with or during a court hearing. 
The federal departments and agencies are subject to various statutes 
governing the protection of business information. There is a criminal 
code provision which prohibits officers and employees of the executive 
branch from publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known “in 
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law” any information 
received during the course of their employment concerning or relating 
to trade secrets or certain similar specified information.% In addition, 
there is a category of laws requiring absolute protection of proprietary 
information by the departments and agencies, and another group man- 
dating qualified safeguarding. All of these authorities will be examined 
shortly. And there are also the exemptions to the rule of information 
disclosure of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).29This statute will 
be considered in a separate, succeeding section. 
The federal criminal law prohibition of agency disclosure “in any 
manner or to any extent not authorized by law” of trade-secret type 
information was enacted in 1948 as one small section of a codification 
statute. The section has come to be known as the Trade Secrets Act. Its 
legislative history indicates that three similar provisions appearing in 
the 1940 edition of the U S .Code-one from an income tax statute:’ one 
from a tariff commission law:1 and one from a commerce department 
authority”-were consolidated to create the new section. According to 
one analyst, the underlying legislative history “nowhere hints that 
Congress sought to alter substantively the reach of the three nondisclo- 
sure statute~.”~’ However, the language of the new section, taken liter- 
ally, sweeps far more broadly than the original three provisions from 
which i t  arose. Further, it appears that the courts “have applied an 
overly broad interpretation of the ~ection.”’~ Thus, the Trade Secrets 
Act has come to be viewed as having effect throughout the executive 
branch. 
It has been said, quite properly, that the language of the section 
“encompasses virtually every category of business information in 
agency file^."'^ And the effect of the act is to punish criminally any 
officer or employee of the United States disclosing such information “in 
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law.” Unfortunately, the 
understanding of the nature of the qualified exception to the section’s 
rule of nondisclosure has been made difficult because Congress did not 
define the phrase “authorized by law” or indicate if disclosure might be 
“authorized” by agency regulations. An even more difficult question 
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concerns the relationship of the Trade Secrets Act to the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
For our purposes, some clarifications in this situation may be 
found in the Supreme Court’s 1979 ruling in the Chrysler case.% Here it 
was affirmed that “properly promulgated, substantive agency regula- 
tions” have the force and effect of law in a variety of contexts, including 
the Trade Secrets According to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
a “substantive” regulation or rule is distinguished from “interpretive 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.”38 Noting this distinction, the Chrysler opinion 
indicated that a substantive or “legislative-type rule” is one “affecting 
individual rights and obligations,” a characteristic which the Court 
deemed “an important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that 
may be ‘binding’ or have the ‘force of the law.’ J’39 In order to have 
binding effect, substantive regulations, said the Court, must be “issued 
by an agency pursuant to statutory authority” and their promulgation 
“must conform with any procedural requirements imposed by Con- 
gress,’’ such as those found in the Administrative Procedure 
The Court then confined itself to a rather limited treatment of the 
relationship between the Trade Secrets Act and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. “Since materials that are exempt from disclosure under the 
FOIA are...outside the ambit of that Act,” said the Chrysler opinion, 
“the Government cannot rely on the FOIA as congressional authoriza- 
tion for disclosure regulations that ermit the release of information b:within the Act’s nine exemptions.” However, because of the condi- 
tions of the case at issue, the Court did not find it necessary to make any 
further determinations regarding the relationship of the two statutes.42 
Thus, there was no judgment regarding the question of whether or not 
the Trade Secrets Act constitutes a nondisclosure law falling within the 
third exemption of the FOIA.43 Indeed, although there was much 
authoritative opinion rejecting the contention that the Trade Secrets 
Act was an exemption 3 statute, the Chrysler decision may have 
rekindled support for the viewpoint.44 The Court also chose to render no 
opinion as to the relationship between the Trade Secrets Act and the 
fourth exemption of the FOIA ertaining to trade secrets and confiden- 
tial commercial information. 4 P  
In view of the Supreme Court’s determination in Chrysler that a 
substantive regulation, in part, must be “issued by an agency pursuant 
to statutory authority” in order to be binding or have the force of law, i t  
is now appropriate to explore the different kinds of statutes providing 
absolute or qualified protection for business information held by fed- 
eral departments and agencies.46 There are various statutory provisions 
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in the U.S.Codeand uncodified laws that impose a general prohibition, 
without exceptions, on the disclosure of proprietary business informa- 
tion obtained during the course of agency operations. For example, in 
conducting an official investigation, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission “may publish from time to time, in its discretion, the 
result of such investigation and such statistical information gathered 
therefrom as it may deem of interest to the public, except data and 
information which would separately disclose the business transactions 
of any person and trade secrets or names of customer^."^' The Federal 
Trade Commission is similarly barred from making public “trade 
secrets and names of customer^."^^ 
There are also a number of statutory provisions that impose a 
general prohibition on the disclosure of certain business information, 
but allow an exception to this rule for Congress and/or congressional 
committees. For example, there are several such protective provisions 
which conclude with the following statement or a closely similar 
phrase: “Nothing in this section shall authorize the withholding of 
information by the Secretary or any officer or employee under his 
control from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.”49 
Further, there are various statutory provisions that impose a gen- 
eral prohibition on the disclosure of certain business information, but 
allow a specific exception for disclosure in any relevant administrative 
or judicial proceeding authorized by statute. The language in a perti- 
nent section of the Flammable Fabrics Act is rather common phrasing 
on this point, indicating that “such information may be disclosed to 
other officers or employees concerned with carrying out this chapter or 
when relevant in any proceeding under this ~hapter.”~’ The Hazardous 
Substances Act makes allowance for the revealing of protected business 
information “to the courts, when relevant in any judicial proceeding 
under this ~ h a p t e r . ” ~ ~  And prohibitions on the disclosure of poultry 
inspection5’ or egg products inspection i n f ~ r m a t i o n ~ ~  entitled to protec- 
tion as a trade secret make allowance for revelation “as ordered by a 
court in any judicial proceeding.” 
There are a few statutory provisions that vest discretionary author- 
ity to protect trade secrets in the head(s) of an agency and require the 
supplier of sensitive business information to request its protection as a 
trade secret. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, 
exercises such authority regarding certain information filed by public 
utility holding companies. Suppliers of this information may make 
written objection to its disclosure, “stating the grounds for such objec- 
tion, and the Commission is authorized to hear objections in any such 
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case where it finds it a d ~ i s a b l e . ” ~ ~  Similarly, certain exempt organiza- 
tions and certain trusts may request that the Secretary of the Treasury or 
his delegate withhold from public inspection some supporting papers 
to their tax exemption applications. The secretary or his delegate must 
determine if the information at issue “relates to any trade secret, patent, 
process, style of work, or apparatus of the organization” and that 
“public disclosure of such information would adversely affect the 
organization. 955 
There are also a few statutory provisions that allow anagency head 
to disclose confidential information, including business information, if 
necessary, to carry out the purposes of a statute or in the interest of 
public health and safety. Examples of this authority may be found in 
provisions concerning certain weather information, 56 electronic pro- 
duct r ad ia t i~n ;~  and boating safety.% 
Finally, there are some statutory provisions that allow the 
exchange of confidential information, including business information, 
between federal agencies. For example, pesticide, 59 vehicle emission,60 
and noise data61 are governed by such law. And in carryingout certain of 
his duties, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to request 
pertinent information, including confidential business information, 
from other federal departments and agencies which are “authorized and 
directed to cooperate with the Secretary and furnish such 
information. y16z 
Freedom of Information Act 
In addition to the types of statutory provisions discussed earlier 
which afford varying degrees of protection for business information, 
there is one other law that provides a measure of safekeeping for busi- 
ness records, but does so in the context of presumptive disclosure. 
Originally enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act provides 
the public with legal authority and a procedure to obtain records held in 
agency files.63 Such records, of course, might have been submitted by a 
business or otherwise might contain sensitive proprietary data. Any 
person, including a business, may request these materials pursuant to 
the FOIA. An agency may decline to provide requested records by 
relying upon exemptions to the rule of disclosure specified in the FOIA. 
Two of these, the third and the fourth exemptions, have particular 
pertinence for business i n f ~ r r n a t i o n . ~ ~  
Businesses do use the FOIA to attempt to obtain information about 
competitors. And while no business wants details about its operations 
and products disclosed in this way, there apparently is also a degree of 
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feeling within the business community that such FOIA requests are not 
improper. In a recent oversight hearing, the chairman of a Senate 
subcommittee queried a witness representing the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce about the propriety of this practice, calling it  “an abuse of 
the intent of the act.” The witness responded, saying: 
I would respectfully disagree with you in that I do not feel that the 
use of the Freedom of Information Act in the manner that you have 
just described is necessarily an abuse of the act. During the Congress 
deliberations over what became the Freedom of Information Act, it 
expressly rejected the notion of a right to know or a need to know in 
order to take advantage of the legislation. So what you have described 
as abuse, in fact represents adaptness and proficiousness in the use of 
the 
In 1984, there were 281,102 reported FOIA requests,66 which was a 
notable increase over the 262,265 request volume of the previous year.67 
Although precise information on the point is not available, probably 50 
to 60percent of these requests are attributable to the business communi- 
ty (i.e., corporations, businesses, legal representatives, or other commer- 
cial representatives). However, this does not mean that these requests 
resulted in the disclosure of any information of entrepreneurial value to 
the requester or, conversely, that valuable proprietary data were lost toa 
competitor. Indeed, it appears that the FOIA is not a very useful tool for 
conducting industrial espionage. Nonetheless, the business community 
continues to have anguish and anxiety about disclosures of its informa- 
tion pursuant to the FOIA. 
Businesses can attempt to prevent an agency from releasing propri- 
etary information that is arguably protectable under one or more of the 
exemptions of the FOIA. In the Chrysler case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the exemptions of the FOIA are not mandatory and neither that 
statute nor the Trade Secrets Act provides a private right of action to 
prevent agency disclosure of information.68 However, the Court indi- 
cated6’ that judicial review of agency action in these matters is available 
to submitters of business records under the Administrative Procedure 
Also, in the aftermath of the Chrysler decision, many agencies 
established procedures for notifying business submitters when their 
records were being sought pursuant to the FOIA and providing an 
opportunity for them to argue against the release of such material. 
While these procedural arrangements are valuable to the business 
community, serious interpretive problems arise from FOIA exemptions 
three and four. In the case of the third exemption, there is the question of 
appropriate statutory provisions that meet the criteria of the exception 
clause. The situation is somewhat more difficult regarding the fourth 
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exemption covering “trade secrets and commercial or financial infor- 
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” In a 
1967 interpretive memorandum on the FOIA, the attorney general 
commented: 
The scope of this exemption is particularly difficult to determine. 
The terms used are general and undefined. Moreover, the sentence 
structure makes it susceptible of several readings, none of which is 
entirely sa t i~fac tory .~~ 
Summarizing the dilemma as i t  has subsequently evolved, Russell 
Stevenson notes “there is no generally agreed definition of what consti- 
tutes a ‘trade secret,’” and adds that “the second part of the exemption, 
for ‘commercial or financial information,’ has left more than ample 
latitude for the protection of commercially sensitive information that 
does not relate to the technical details of a manufacturing process.”72 
The difficult question then arises as to when information should be 
considered “privileged and confidential?” Generally accepted judicial 
guidance on this point comes from the National Parks case: informa- 
tion is “confidential” within the terms of the fourth exemption if 
disclosure would either (1) impair the ability of the government to 
obtain similar such information in the future, or (2) “cause substantial 
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the informa- 
tion was obtained.”73 Although i t  has been somewhat difficult to deter- 
mine what “substantial harm to the competitive position” of a 
submitter means, the courts, notes Stevenson, “have imposed the 
burden of showing some injury on the private party who has supplied 
the information and seeks to prevent its release” and required “more 
than unsupported, conclusory allegations of potential harm.”74 This 
interpretative dilemma in litigation to prevent agency disclosure of 
submitters’ business information has resulted in what Stevenson calls, 
with a bit of understatement, “varying and inconsistent results.”75 And 
while many businesses are probably not pleased with this situation, its 
unsettled status offers hope that a favorable public policy will subse- 
quently result. 
Conclusion 
This brief overview has generally explored the contexts in which 
secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of public policy. 
The situation is a fluid one, with businesses vying with each other for 
information to improve their market standing. It is also a situation 
filled with dynamics, including continuous tension as to the kinds and 
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quantities of business information that are provided to government as 
well as the arrangements under which it is obtained, maintained, and 
utilized by agencies of the state. Businesses are continuously attempting 
to make or keep secret that information that they determine to merit 
protection. They are understandably satisfied when the balance of favor 
in public policy leans toward protection. Conversely, of course, their 
anxieties arise and mount in the face of public policy disposed toward 
disclosure. 
But, to what extent is secrecy-effective concealment or hiding- 
actually being realized in these matters? Indications are that what busi- 
nesses have attained in public policy regarding their proprietary 
information is not secrecy, but control over its disclosure. In their 
separate ways, the law of trade secrets, licensing arrangements, and 
patenting provide this control. And when business information is 
turned over to federal agencies, statutes, in varying degrees, exert this 
control. The Freedom of Information Act poses a threat because the 
business community is presently uncertain about the measure of control 
that may be exercised to check agencies’ decisions to disclose business 
information pursuant to the statute. 
Some might argue with this change in characterization or contend 
that it is a distinction without a difference. However, i t  appears that the 
term secrecy functionally is not an accurate descriptor, but has impor- 
tant symbolic value in these matters. Indeed, if law and public policy 
give recognition to business information as a secret, reinforced by 
sanctions for disclosure, who shall not honor its privileged status? 
Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not 
attributable to any other source. 
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